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The Audit Committee Chair Forum (ACCF) is convened by the CBI and Ernst & Young and is 
facilitated by Cranfield University.
The Forum comprises a select group of audit committee chairs from the UK’s leading companies. 
Our aim is twofold, namely: 
  to influence the direction of regulation as it impacts audit committees, and 
  to act as a vehicle to develop points of view and best practice.
The Forum provides an opportunity to contribute to the debate, influence its direction and improve 
the performance of audit committees.
The Forum is currently chaired jointly by Richard Wilson, Senior Partner at Ernst & Young, and 
Helen Alexander, President of the CBI.
This is the twelfth paper produced by the ACCF. Previous papers include: 
  The role and function of the Audit Committee 
  The drivers of audit quality 
  What is an effective audit and how can you tell? 
  Audit Committee regulation: ‘Financial literacy’ – what does it mean? 
  Audit Committee communication: What is said, why, how and to whom? 
  The role of the Audit Committee in risk management 
  The role of the Audit Committee regarding non-audited information 
  The Audit Committee and the credit crunch
  Risk management in a cost-cutting environment 
  A Conversation with a Regulator: Meeting with Paul Boyle, Chief Executive of the Financial 
Reporting Council
  Telling a good story? Meeting with Bill Knight and David Lindsell, Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman of the Financial Reporting Review Panel
To obtain copies or learn more about the ACCF please contact  
the Forum Secretary, Caroline Das-Monfrais at the CBI 
caroline.dasmonfrais@cbi.org.uk
1Executive summary
The UK 
governance 
regime
The UK governance regime for non-financial 
companies is, by and large, working in the manner 
intended.
The need for 
change
The banking crisis and the recession it triggered have 
damaged public confidence in the corporate sector. 
There is an acceptance that changes need to be seen 
to take place, although it is not clear what changes are 
appropriate.
Consultation 
on the 
Combined 
Code
The ongoing consultation on changes to the Combined 
Code was discussed. The Walker recommendations 
are addressed specifically to banks and financial 
institutions, and it would not be appropriate for them to 
spill over into the corporate world as a whole.
A suggested change from ‘Comply or Explain’ to 
‘Apply or Explain’ was seen as positive. However, 
there will remain problems with investors who 
automatically regard the ‘explain’ route as a failure of 
governance.
The composition of the board, and the skills and 
experience of its independent directors (IDs), should 
reflect the needs and context of the company, rather 
than being prescribed by regulation.
It was considered that there is no need for a 
requirement to specify a minimum time commitment 
for IDs.  
The current assumption that non-executives are not 
‘independent’ after nine years is not appropriate to all 
companies.
It would be appropriate for company chairmen to face 
annual re-election to the board.
Board evaluation is useful, but there is a danger of its 
form becoming too prescribed.
The role of 
investors in 
corporate 
governance
Changes in capital markets and the nature of the investing 
institutions could have an impact on the way in which 
corporate governance is conducted in the UK.
Engagement with institutional investors is not always 
simple. Different approaches are taken by their 
investor teams and their governance teams.
The 
increasing 
level of 
published 
disclosures
It seems probable that any changes to the Combined 
Code will  result in an increase in companies’ 
published disclosures. The value of some current 
disclosures was queried.
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2Introduction
This paper reflects the discussions at a meeting of the Audit Committee Chair Forum 
(ACCF) held on 24th September 2009, which was addressed by Mr Peter Williams.  Mr 
Williams is chair of the Investor Relations and Markets Committee of The Hundred Group, 
which represents the finance directors of the 100 largest publicly-traded companies in the 
United Kingdom.
The meeting was attended by nine chairs of the audit committees of leading companies, a 
representative of one of the major accounting bodies, a representative of the CBI, and two 
partners and a director from Ernst & Young.  
Mr Williams addressed his opening comments to recent and proposed changes in the UK 
governance regime, which led to a lively discussion.
3A need for change?
“We don’t think Corporate Governance is broken.”  (PW)
“If nothing changes, nobody will be satisfied.”1
The financial crisis has led to a recession, and resulted in a lack of confidence in the corporate world; this 
cannot be denied.  However, the general view of the meeting was that it was directly the result of a failure 
of the banking and financial services sectors: the non-financial sectors have stood up reasonably well, and 
their governance processes have not been found to be inadequate.  Accordingly, there was a strong feeling 
that although there are areas where the system should be altered or improved, wholesale change would be 
counter-productive.
Nevertheless, it was appreciated that some change is inevitable.  The legitimacy of UK plc is granted, 
ultimately, by politicians, the media and the public.  The banking crisis, the furore over executive 
remuneration, and individual cases such as that of the Phoenix Four have led to a widely-held mistrust of 
the system.  Even if those within it are satisfied with its strengths, those outside need overt reassurance - 
“Something is going to need to be seen to be done.”
1 Quotes that not are attributed were made by audit committee chairs.
4The outlook for change: Walker and the Code
 “The Walker recommendations may be suitable for banks, but that doesn’t 
necessarily mean they are good for the rest of UK corporates as a whole.”  
(PW)
Two significant reviews will impact on corporate governance in the UK.  The first is the 
Walker Review, which looked at governance in banks and other financial institutions.  
Initiated in February 2009; its first consultation paper was issued in July.  A summary of 
its recommendations relevant to this ACCF meeting is attached at Appendix 1.
Concurrent with the Walker Review, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) conducted a 
review of the Combined Code.  This review was done rather earlier than would normally 
have been the case: the overlaps in terms of reference with Walker meant that it was 
appropriate for the two to be conducted in parallel.  That way, it was hoped that banking 
solutions could be found for banking problems without affecting the rest of the governance 
regime 2.  The questions asked in the review of the Code are set out in Appendix 2 to this 
report, and its preliminary feedback is summarised at Appendix 3.
Those potential governance changes discussed in the ACCF meeting are set out in the rest 
of this paper.  
2  See the Report of the ACCF meeting held on 19th March 2009 – A Conversation with a Regulator
5Apply or Explain
“It’s not a battle you need to initiate with the box-tickers and scribblers.”
The ‘comply or explain’ approach to corporate governance, introduced by the widely-
acclaimed Cadbury report in 1992, has proved successful and has been adopted around the 
world.  Nevertheless, there is growing support for this wording to be amended.
The problem expressed by all at the meeting, which has been a regular theme at other 
ACCF discussions, is that many of the institutional investors and their representative bodies 
appear to regard ‘comply’ as the sole correct behaviour, and any attempt to ‘explain’ is 
seen as a failure of corporate governance.  Accordingly, it was felt that all explanations 
by individual boards of why they have adapted their governance to reflect their own 
circumstances, will attract criticism.  Such criticism is often conducted through the media, 
to the detriment of the company and, arguably, its shareholders.  ACCF members identified 
instances where a desire to avoid such censure had led to a non-optimal approach being 
adopted in conducting the board’s affairs.
Many of the responses to the FRC’s review of the Code have suggested a move to an ‘apply 
or explain’ approach.  Whilst broadly the same, this subtle change is regarded as likely to 
encourage a more thoughtful and flexible approach from the institutions:  unlike ‘comply’, 
the word ‘apply’ does not imply a regulatory imperative.  This change of wording was 
favoured by the ACCF meeting.
 
6Boards and directors
“It’s all about the chemistry of how the board fits together.”  (PW)
The composition of the board
“But if you spend more time  …  real danger is that you get too involved in the 
operational issues and there is a danger of compromising your independence.”
There was considerable discussion about the need to have relevant skills and experience 
within the body of independent directors, to enable them to make constructive challenges 
to the executives.  It was accepted that such expertise is important within banking and 
financial services.  However, outside those sectors, the view generally was that companies 
choose experienced and appropriate individuals to join their boards, and such individuals, 
whilst not experts in the specific industries, are experienced in board process.  It is possible 
to be a challenging director  without direct industry expertise.  Furthermore, the need 
for more specific skills was increasing the size of boards, making them potentially less 
effective and reducing still further the number of board executives.  This was not seen as a 
particularly good direction to take governance.
Related to this, there was a lot of comment about the Walker proposals for a minimum 
‘contracted’ amount of time an independent director should spend on the company.  
Generally, the meeting felt that sufficient time was being spent by IDs, and that increasing 
the time commitment could lead them into a more executive rather than an overview role, 
which was not desirable.  It was also noted that increasing the formal time commitment 
would exclude from the non executive pool those individuals who have other commitments, 
such as CEOs and CFOs of other companies.
(Having made this point, there was support for a suggestion than in their first year, 
independent directors should double the time they spend with the company, to get a much 
more thorough induction and enable them to contribute more quickly.)
This discussion went on more widely to consider the unitary board structure within the 
UK, and noted that, as the numbers of independent directors rise and their responsibilities 
increase, in practice, this is sometimes looking like a two-tier structure.
Fundamentally, corporate governance is not a matter of making sure the relevant boxes 
are ticked, and following all the detailed rules for membership will not ensure an effective 
team of directors.  This is a behavioural issue, about the culture of the company and the 
board.  As such, the role of the chairman of the board is fundamentally important.  There 
was some discussion about the chairman’s role and that of the senior independent director 
(SID).  To many, the role of the SID and the value added by the position were unclear.
7Risk management and the board
“To hive off risk into some sort of risk committee seems to be a dereliction of the 
duties of the board.”
As part of the discussion on the composition and duties of the board, the issue arose of 
where responsibilities lie for considering business risks.
This is a perennial issue for the ACCF and has been visited at several meetings3: there is no 
one configuration of such board responsibilities that fits all companies.  In some, the audit 
committee is responsible just for financial risk, with a risk committee (often an executive 
committee) taking the lead as regards more general risks.  Other companies have the audit 
committee overseeing all risk, or have a separate risk committee reporting into the audit 
committee.  Others again have two board committees, but with the audit committee chair 
sitting as a member of both.
3 For example, the ACCF meeting held on 10th July 2007 - The Role of the Audit Committee in Risk Management.
8Board evaluation
“How do you let the community know that you have actually made step-changes 
in what you are doing?” (EY)
The 2003 Combined Code introduced a requirement for “formal and rigorous” annual 
evaluation of the board and its committees.  
The meeting agreed that board evaluation can produce good results, beneficial to the 
company, if done properly.  However, proposals which potentially standardise the way in 
which evaluations are done will restrict the freedom of companies to tailor the work to their 
own needs, and could diminish their usefulness.
The view was expressed that companies’ governance reports often fail to explain clearly 
how they carry out their evaluations, and the benefits.  Disclosures now are often just 
‘boilerplate’; this should be removed and the quality of disclosure could and should be 
improved, for the benefit of the company as well as the readers.
9Staying on the board
“On the whole, it’s a bit more difficult to get people off [the board] than to bring 
them on.”
Tenure
The Combined Code states that non executives who serve more than nine years are no 
longer considered to be independent.  This almost always leads to them having to leave the 
board.  There was much discussion about whether this provision was a good one.  Views 
were expressed both for and against.  
Three arguments were made for relaxing this requirement.  Firstly, individuals can retain 
their independence of mind over a longer period.  Secondly, it can be to the company’s 
benefit to retain a particular individual on the board.  And finally, shareholders always 
have the ability to remove a director from the board, either by voting under the standard 
rotational provisions, or, in particular circumstances, by direct pressure.
However, the alternate view was also strongly represented.  This was that it is good to 
refresh a board, and that any particular individual who was felt to be essential could be 
retained, under ‘comply or explain’.  
Re-election
Proposals have been aired for each director on a board to face re-election annually, rather 
than the more customary three year terms adopted by many boards.  This was seen as 
being unnecessary.  Indeed, for executives on the board it could lead to difficulties in 
running the company and problems in succession planning.
A different view was taken as regards the chairman of the board.  It was broadly agreed 
that annual re-election for this office was appropriate, as the chairman is responsible for the 
whole board.  Also, a view was expressed that the chairman’s term should normally not be 
any longer than six years, to prevent them getting stale in this demanding role.
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Executive remuneration
A brief discussion took place about the various proposed changes to executive remuneration 
practices 4.  It was generally agreed that it is appropriate to link pay to risk, and to a longer 
time period.  However, the practicalities of clawback were considered challenging.
There should be liaison between the remuneration committee and the audit committee.  
If there is a risk committee, this too should have an input into or an awareness of the 
discussions.
 
4 In addition to the Walker Review, these include the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee report on the banking crisis, and the 
European Commission Recommendations on executive pay.
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The role of the investor
“The Code is meant to be a bridge over the agency problem between the owners 
and the managers. It requires the owners to behave in a certain way for that 
bridge to be effective.”
“We are disappointed with the shareholders.”
The philosophy of corporate governance in the UK developed in an environment where 
a majority of shares were held by large financial institutions, often situated in close 
geographic proximity to each other.  Many influential individuals holding long-term 
investing positions knew each other, and worked together.  In such circumstances, 
principles-based regulation which required active participation could work well.  However, 
capital has become significantly more mobile; shareholders often act as traders rather than 
owners; and a significant proportion of UK plc is held by foreign institutions.  Overall, it is 
felt that this has led to less engagement by shareholders.
For UK governance to work well, there needs to be engagement from both sides.  In recent 
months Lord Myners, HM Treasury’s Financial Services Secretary, has made several 
suggestions about how institutional shareholders could and should become more involved 
in the governance of companies.  The FRC’s progress report on the review of the Combined 
Code also addresses this issue.  
The ACCF meeting noted the frustrations of dealing with institutional investors where 
the investing arm has no interest in the governance aspects, and the compliance arm does 
not interact with the investment side.  With such a split, it is easy to see how a box-ticking 
mentality can arise, which reduces the value of thoughtful governance.
However, it was noted that shareholders do vote more actively than they used to.
The private equity model of ownership was also discussed, where there is little liquidity for 
shareholders, and a different form of governance with more engagement from the owners.  
The model of ownership for alternative investments has less of an agency problem than the 
traditional market relationship, and it was considered possible that this model may become 
more prevalent.
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The value of disclosure
“It costs us far more to put together some of the unbelievably intricate disclosures 
in the back end of the financial accounts – about which we’ve equally never had 
a single comment.”  (PW)
The level and complexity of governance disclosures is increasing, not necessarily to the 
benefit of the users.  Although such disclosures are not the most time-consuming element 
of putting together the annual report, their value was queried.  With the exception of the 
directors’ remuneration report, which does attract comment, none of those present could 
remember ever having had a question from institutional investors or at the AGM about any 
of the governance disclosures in the annual report.  They neither aid the running of the 
business nor increase its share price. 
The feeling of the meeting was that although the act of disclosing does address some issues 
of accountability, the boilerplate nature of many disclosures does little for transparency.  
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Conclusions
“[I am] concerned that FRC will feel it necessary to come up with a political 
solution, not a reasonable solution.”
The governance regime is changing in response to a changed environment and perception.  
Although some of these changes were seen as potentially positive, there was a worry that 
there would be “…more regulation; more disclosures; more oversight and inspection”.  A 
common concern was that this increase in the regulatory burden would stifle corporate 
activity without actually improving governance and accountability.  It was feared that too 
much new regulation would be counter-productive, and the only increased output would be 
that of the box-tickers.
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Appendix 1
Relevant Recommendations from the Walker Review 
The Table below summarises those Walker Review recommendations that were touched upon   
at the ACCF meeting.  It does not include all of the Review’s 39 recommendations.
Board size, 
composition 
and 
qualification
NEDs on BOFI5 boards should be expected to give greater time 
commitment than has been normal in the past. The Review suggests a 
minimum expected time commitment of 30 to 36 days for the board of 
a major bank.
The balance of the board should enable them to have an appropriate 
level of knowledge and understanding as required to equip them to 
engage proactively in board deliberation, above all on risk strategy.
Functioning 
of the board; 
the roles of 
the NED and 
the chairman; 
and evaluation 
of board 
performance
NEDs should be ready, able and encouraged to challenge and test 
proposals on strategy put forward by the executive. They should satisfy 
themselves that board discussion and decision-taking on risk matters is 
based on accurate and appropriately comprehensive information. 
The chairman should be expected to commit a substantial proportion  
of his or her time, probably not less than two-thirds, to the business of 
the entity.
The chairman of a BOFI board should be proposed for election on an 
annual basis. 
The role of the senior independent director (SID) should be to 
provide a sounding board for the chairman, for the evaluation of the 
chairman and to serve as a trusted intermediary for the NEDs as and 
when necessary. The SID should be accessible to shareholders in the 
event that communication with the chairman becomes difficult or 
inappropriate.
The board should undertake a formal and rigorous evaluation of its 
performance with external facilitation of the process every second 
or third year. The statement on this evaluation should be a separate 
section of the annual report describing the work of the board, the 
nomination or corporate governance committee as appropriate. 
The role of 
institutional 
shareholders: 
communication 
and 
engagement
The present best practice “Statement of Principles – the 
Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents” should 
be ratified by the FRC and become the core of the Principles for 
Stewardship. Fund managers and other institutions authorised by the 
FSA to undertake investment business should signify on their websites 
their commitment to the Principles for Stewardship.
5 BOFI - Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
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Governance of 
risk
The board of a BOFI should establish a board risk committee 
separately from the audit committee with responsibility for oversight 
and advice to the board on the current risk exposures of the entity and 
future risk strategy.  
The board risk report should be included as a separate report within 
the annual report and accounts. 
Remuneration The remit of the remuneration committee should be extended where 
necessary to cover all aspects of remuneration policy on a firm-wide 
basis with particular emphasis on the risk dimension. 
Deferral of incentive payments should provide the primary risk 
adjustment mechanism to align rewards with sustainable performance 
for executive board members and ‘high-end’ executives.
Incentives should be balanced so that at least one-half of variable 
remuneration offered in respect of a financial year is in the form of 
a long-term incentive scheme with vesting subject to a performance 
condition with half of the award vesting after not less than three years 
and of the remainder after five years. 
Clawback should be used as the means to reclaim amounts in limited 
circumstances of misstatement and misconduct.
Executive board members and ‘high-end’ executives should be 
expected to maintain a shareholding or retain a portion of vested 
awards in an amount at least equal to their total compensation on a 
historic or expected basis, to be built up over a period at the discretion 
of the remuneration committee. 
If the non-binding resolution on a remuneration committee report 
attracts less than 75 per cent of the total votes cast, the chairman 
of the committee should stand for re-election in the following year 
irrespective of his or her normal appointment term.
Source:  A Review Of Corporate Governance In UK Banks And Other Financial Industry 
Entities,  Sir David Walker, 16 June 2009.
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Appendix 2
Review of the Effectiveness of the Combined Code
In March 2009, the Financial Reporting Council began a periodic review of the Combined Code.  Below are 
set out the questions that were asked (with original paragraph numbering).
Issues for comment
10. The FRC would welcome views on both the content of the Combined Code and the way that it has been 
applied by companies and enforced by investors using the ‘comply or explain’ mechanism.
11. The Combined Code consists of high-level principles and more detailed provisions. While boards are 
expected to apply the principles, ‘comply or explain’ allows them a degree of flexibility in choosing whether to 
follow the Code’s individual provisions. Bearing this in mind, views are invited on these questions:
Which parts of the Code have worked well? Do any of them need further reinforcement? ●
Have any parts of the Code inadvertently reduced the effectiveness of the board? ●
Are there any aspects of good governance practice not currently addressed by the Code or its related  ●
guidance that should be?
Is the ‘comply or explain’ mechanism operating effectively and, if not, how might its operation be  ●
improved? Views are invited on the usefulness  of company disclosures and the quantity and quality of 
engagement by investors.
Content of the Code
12. While respondents are welcome to comment on any aspect of the Code, the FRC would particularly 
welcome views on:
The composition and effectiveness of the board as a whole; ●
The respective roles of the chairman, the executive leadership of the company and the non-executive  ●
directors;
The board’s role in relation to risk management; ●
The role of the remuneration committee; ●
The quality of support and information available to the board and its committees; and ●
The content and effectiveness of Section 2 of the Code, which is addressed to institutional shareholders and  ●
encourages them to enter into a dialogue with companies based on a mutual understanding of objectives 
and make considered use of their votes.
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Application of the Code
13. The ‘comply or explain’ approach has a number of theoretical advantages over traditional 
regulation: it allows boards a degree of flexibility in designing their governance arrangements, 
and it enables shareholders to judge whether those arrangements will make it more likely that 
the board will act in their long-term interest.
14. In order to be effective it requires boards to provide investors with the necessary 
information on which to make that judgement, in particular where they have chosen not to 
follow the Combined Code; and it requires a sufficient number of investors to take a long-term 
view and to engage constructively with the companies in which they invest through dialogue 
and the use of their voting and other rights.
15. The 2007 review found that, while the ‘comply or explain’ approach was felt to be working 
reasonably well, there were some concerns on both counts. The FRC would be interested to 
know whether those concerns have increased or decreased in the intervening period and, if 
they still remain, whether there are steps that could be taken by the FRC or others to increase 
the usefulness of disclosures and the effectiveness of engagement.
Source:  Review Of The Effectiveness Of The Combined Code:  Call for Evidence.  Financial 
Reporting Council,  March 2009
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Appendix 3
Review of the Effectiveness of the Combined 
Code:  Feedback
In March 2009, the Financial Reporting Council began a periodic review of the Combined 
Code.  In July 2009 it published its summary of the responses to date from that consultation.  
The summary of those responses is set out verbatim below.
Summary of feedback to date
The FRC believes that the strength of the response means that what we have heard can 
reasonably be assumed to be representative of the view of market participants as a whole. That 
view can be summarised as:
The Combined Code and its predecessors have contributed to clear improvements in  ●
governance standards since the first code was introduced in 1992;
While there are differing views about the extent to which the perceived shortcomings  ●
in governance in the banking sector are replicated in the listed sector as a whole, many 
consider at least some of them to be specific to that sector;
There is a recognition that the quality of corporate governance ultimately depends on  ●
behaviour not process, with the result that there is a limit to the extent to which any 
regulatory framework can deliver good governance; and
Market participants have expressed a strong preference for retaining the current approach  ●
of ‘soft law’ underpinned by some regulation, rather than moving to one more reliant on 
legislation and regulation. It is seen as better able to react to developments in best practice, 
and because it can take account of the different circumstances in which companies operate 
it can set higher standards to which they are encouraged to aspire.
While the view of a large majority of respondents was that there is no need for a complete 
overhaul of the content of the Combined Code, there are a number of parts of the Code which 
need further review and possibly revision. These are addressed in Section 1 of this report.
Both companies and investors have expressed reservations about the way in which “comply or 
explain” works in practice, and it is clear that more needs to be done to encourage all parties 
to apply it in the intended manner. These issues are addressed in Section 2 of the report.
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The FRC shares the market’s view that the flexible ‘soft law’ approach remains the most 
appropriate way of raising standards of corporate governance in listed companies, as does Sir 
David Walker in his recent consultation paper. But the continuing credibility of this approach 
depends on there being consensus that the contents of the Code are conducive to best practice, 
and on companies and investors acting in the spirit, not just the letter, of the Code and 
“comply or explain”. 
In particular it is of critical importance that there are sufficient institutional investors willing 
and able to engage actively with the companies in which they invest. This cannot be taken for 
granted – dispersed ownership, the declining market share of UK insurance companies and 
pension funds and resource constraints are all potential obstacles to achieving this objective. 
In their turn, companies must be willing to welcome communication with their shareholders 
as an opportunity to obtain an informed external perspective on their performance.
Next steps
The FRC is not making any specific proposals to amend the Code or enhance “comply or 
explain” at this stage. If it is concluded that any such changes would be appropriate, these will 
be subject to separate consultation later in the year.
The FRC aims to publish its final report, and begin consultation on whatever changes may be 
proposed to the Combined Code, before the end of the year. Subject to the outcome of that 
consultation, a revised Code would take effect in mid-2010.
Source:  Review Of The Effectiveness Of The Combined Code: Progress report and second 
consultation.  Financial Reporting Council,  July 2009
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